Wanner v. State, Dept. of Transportation Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 37059 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
2-4-2010
Wanner v. State, Dept. of Transportation Appellant's
Brief Dckt. 37059
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"Wanner v. State, Dept. of Transportation Appellant's Brief Dckt. 37059" (2010). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 2370.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/2370
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STEVE M. WANNER, 1 




STATE OF IDAHO, 1 





Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District 
of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Franklin 
I-Ionorable David C. Nye, District Judge 
Stephen J. Muhonen (ISB#: 6689) 
RACINE, OLSON, NYE, 
BUDGE & BAILEY, CHARTERED 
P.O. Box 1391 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-1391 
Telephone: (208) 232-6101 
Fax: (208) 232-6109 
Attorney f i r  Defendant/Appellant 
Gregory C. May 
MAY RAMMELL & THOMPSON, CI-ITD. 
P. 0. Box 370 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204 
Telephone: (208) 233-0132 
Fax: (208) 234-2961 
Attorney for Petitioner/Respondent 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  I . STATEMENT OF THE CASE 1 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  A . NATURE OF THE CASE 1 
B . STATEMENT OF FACTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  C . COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 2 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  I1 . ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 5 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  111 . STANDARD OF REVIEW 5 
IV . ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7 
A . WANNER IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING 
PURSUANT TO I.C. 5 18-8002 AND I.C. 5 18-8002A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
B . THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ITS DETERMINATION 
THAT THE NOTICE OF SUSPENSION FORM DENIED 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  WANNER DUE PROCESS 11 
1 . Wanner Had Adeauate Notice Of The Potential Consequences 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  For Failure Of Evidentiarv Testing 11 
2 . Wanner's Constitutional Due Process Rights I-Iave Not Been Violated . . 19 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  V . CONCLUSION 23 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Aberdeen-Sprin&eld Canal Co . v . Peiper. 133 Idaho 82. 982 P.2d 917 (1999) 
Cheekv . Unitedstates. 498 U.S. 192. 111 S.Ct. 604. 112 L.Ed.2d 617 (1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17 
Cobbley v . City of Challis. 143 Idaho 130. 139 P.3d 732 (2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9. 10 
Cowan v . Board of Comm 'rs. 143 Idaho 501. 148 P.3d 1247 (2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20 
Dry Creek Partners. LLC v . Ada County Comm 'rs. - Idaho -. 21 7 P.3d 1282 (2009) . . . . . . .  6 
Electrical Wholesale Supply Co . v . Nielson. 136 Idaho 8 14. 41 P.3d 242 (2001) . . . . . . . . . . . .  18 
Escarcega v . Wyonzing Department of Transportation. 153 P.3d 264 (Wyo . 2007) . . . . . . .  15-1 8 
Halen v . State. 136 Idaho. 829. 41 P.3d 257 (2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14 
HUM, v. Idaho State Bd . ofMed., 140 Idaho 152. 90 P.3d 902 (2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6 
In re Driver's License Suspension of Gibbar. 
143 Idaho 937. 155 P.3d 1176 (Ct . App . 2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
In re Driver's License Suspension of McNeely. 
I I9 Ida110 182. 804 P.2d 91 1 (Ct . App . 1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  .20. 22 
Lane Ranch P'ship v . City of Sun Valley. 144 Idaho 584. 166 P.3d 374 (2007) . . . . . . . . . . . .  5. 6 
Mathews v . Eldridge. 424 U.S. 3 19. 96 S . Ct . 893. 47 L . Ed . 2d 18 (1 976) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Meyes v . finsen. - I d a h o .  221 P.3d 81 (2009) 20 
Nation v . State. Dept . of Corr.. 144 Idaho 177. 158 P.3d 953 (2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10 
Powers v . Canyon County. 108 Idaho 967. 703 P.2d 1342 (1985) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12 
Spencer v . Kootenai County. 145 Idaho 448. 180 P.3d 487 (2008) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  State v . Ankey. 109 Idaho 1. 704 P.2d 333 (1985) 20 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  State v . Diaz. 144 Idaho 300. 160 P.3d 739 (2007) 12 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  State v . Reed. 107 Idaho 162. 686 P.2d 842 (Ct . App . 1984) 22 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Virgil v . State. 126 Idaho 946. 895 P.2d 182 (Ct . App . 1995) 13 
Statutes 
Idaho Code $ 18-8002 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Idaho Code $ 18-8004 .2.7.8. 12 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Idaho Code $ 18-8005 17. 18 
IdahoCode$18-8006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7. 8 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Idaho Code $49-330 13 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Idaho Code $49-105 1 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Idaho Code $49-105 1 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Idaho Code $49-123 1 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Idaho Code $49-326 .4.5.  13.21. 22 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Idaho Code $49-335 4.5.13-15. 17-22 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Idaho Code $67-5271 10 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Idaho Code $67-5279 5. 6 
Rules 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 84(a) 9 
Administrative Rules 
Idaho Administrative Procedure Act . . . . . . . . . .  
I. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case involves an administrative license suspension ("ALS") arising from 
LC. $18-8002A. 
B. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Steve M. Wanner ("Wanner"), whom has both commercial and non-commerciai vehicle 
driving privileges', pursuant to his commercial drivers license ("CDL")' issued by the Idaho 
Department of Transportation ("IDOT"), was operating anon-commercial vehicle on August 7,2008 
when he was arrested for allegedly driving under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs ("DUI"). R., 
pp. 17-19. Following his arrest, the arresting officer requested Wanner to submit to toxicology 
testing, pursuant to I.C. $5 18-8002 and 18-8002A. R., pp. 14, 18. Wanner was read and had 
explained to him the Notice of Suspension for Failure of Evidentiary Testing (Advisory for 
$$ 18-8002 and 18-8002A, Idaho Code) ("Notice of Suspension Form"). Id. 
'Idaho Code $49-105(16)(d) describes a Class D drivers license as a license "that shall be 
issued and valid for the operation of a motor vehicle that is not a commercial vehicle as defined in 
section 49-123, Idaho Code." IDAHO CODE $ 49-105(16)(d). 
'Idaho Code $49- 105(16)(a) describes a Class A commercial driver's license as a license that 
"shall he issued and valid for the operation of any combination of motor vehicles with a 
manufacturer's gross combination weight rating (GCWR) inexcess of twenty-six thousand (26,000) 
pounds, provided the manufacturer's gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) of the vehicle(s) being 
towed is in excess of ten thousand (10,000) pounds. Persons holding a valid class A license may 
also operate vehicles requiring a class B,C or D license." IDAHO CODE 49-105(16)(a). Wanner has 
a Class A CDL. R., pp. I4,24. 
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Following the arresting officers reading and explaining of the Notice of Suspension Form, 
Wanner agreed to submit to two breath tests on the Intoxilyzer 5000. Id. The results of the breath 
tests showed Wanner's BAC to be 0.094 and 0.090.3 R., p. 16. Following Wanner's failure of the 
breath tests, the arresting officer then provided Wanner a copy of the Notice of Suspension Form, 
for which Wanner signed. R., p. 14. On August 13,2008, the arresting officer forwarded the Notice 
of Suspension form and his accompanying paperwork, test results and sworn statement to the Idaho 
Department of Transportation ("IDOT"). R., p. 22. 
On or about August 21,2008, fourteen (14) days after his arrest, Wanner, through counsel, 
submitted his request for an administrative hearing pursuant to "I.C. 5 18-8002A".4 R., pp. 5-6. On 
or about August 22, 2008 IDOT provided Wanner notice that his request for an administrative 
hearing pursuant to I.C. $18-8002A was denied because it was filed beyond the seven (7) day 
deadline contained in the statute. R., p. 4. 
C. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
On or about the 18th day of September, 2008 Wanner timely filed his Notice of Petition for 
Judicial Review of Administrative Order and Request for Stay of License Suspension. R., pp. 1-3. 
'The legal limit of blood alcohol content ("BAC") for individuals operating non-commercial 
vehicles is 0.08. IDAHO CODE 18-8004(l)(a). The legal limit of BAC for individuals operating 
commercial vehicles is 0.04. IDAHO CODE 18-8004(1)(b). 
4111 Wanner's Request For Administrative Hearing he wrote, "Notice is hereby given, 
pursuant to I.C. $1 8-8002A that Steve M. Wanner, UG257658F, requests an administrative hearing 
on the validity of the suspension of his license." R., p. 5. 
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On September 19,2008 an order staying the suspension ofwarmer's driving privileges was signed. 
R., p. 30. 
On January 13, 2009 IDOT filed its motion and accompanying memorandum, seeking 
dismissal of Wanner's petition for judicial review due to Wanner's failure to timely request an 
administrative hearing pursuant to LC. (i 18-8002A. R., pp. 47-55. On February23,2009 the district 
court entered its decision, denying IDOT's motion to dismiss. R., pp. 56-58. 
On or about March 30,2009 Wanner filed his opening brief with the district court. R., pp. 
62-73. In his brief, Wanner conceded that the arresting officer read and explained the Notice of 
Suspension Form to him and also provided him with a copy of the Notice of Suspension Form, 
which he signed. R., pp. 63-65. After receiving his copy of theNotice of Suspension Form, Wanner 
did review the Notice of Suspension Form and acknowledged that he did have notice that if he 
wanted an administrative hearing, he had to request it within seven (7) days from the date of the 
notice of suspension. R., pp. 64-65. Wanner chose not to request a hearing within the seven (7) day 
period based upon his own belief that he could live with the 90 day suspension of his driving 
privileges. R., pp. 64-65; Tu. p. 4, LL. 10-21. 
On July 2,2009 oral argument was held before the district courlrelative to Wanner's Petition 
for Judicial Review. R., pp. 94-95. On July 31, 2009 the district court entered its Decision on 
Appeal From Administrative Iiearing. R., pp. 104-108. In its July, 3 1,2009 decision, the court ruled 
that Wanner had not received adequate due process notice of the consequences for failing the 
evidentiary test as it relates to his commercial driving privileges and as such, he was entitled to a13 
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administrative hearing. R., pp. 107-1 08. The court further held that had the Notice of Suspension 
Form included the consequences as detailed in 1.C. $49-335(2), i.e. that Wanner's CDL would be 
suspended for one year, that Wanner would have timely requested an administrative hearing. R., 
p. 107. 
On September 2,2009 IDOT fiied its Petition for Rehearing with the district court. R., pp. 
112-1 13. The basis for the Petition for Rehearing was for clarification purposes. IDOT could not 
determine fiom the district court's decision whether Wanner's non-commercial driving privileges 
should be suspended pursuant to I.C. 518-8002A since Wanner's petition for judicial review arose 
from IDOT's denial of allowing Wanner to have an administrative hearing pursuant to 
I.C. $18-8002A. In its petition, IDOT acknowledged that should Wanner's commercial driving 
privileges become suspended, then he was still entitled to an administrative hearing pursuant to I.C. 
$49-326(4). R., pp. 112-1 13. 
On September 9,2009 a hearing was held on IDOT's Petition for Rehearing. R., p. 114. On 
September 10,2009 the district court entered its Amended Decision on Appeal From Administrative 
Hearing. R., pp. 116-121. In its amended decision, the district court ruled that the Notice of 
Suspension Form was clear as to "regular" licensed drivers operating non-commercial vehicles. R., 
p. 11 8. However, the court held that the Notice of Suspension Form was vague as to CDL licensed 
drivers operating non-commercial vehicles because it did not contain the penalties as detailed in 
I.C. $49-335(2), specifically, that CDL holders are disqualified from operating a commercial motor 
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vehicle for a period of one year if they fail a test to determine a driver's alcohol, drug or other 
intoxicating substances concentration while operating a motor vehicle. R., pp. 119-120. 
Due to the Notice of Suspension form not containing the provisions of I.C. $49-335(2), the 
court held that due process had been violated and that Wanner was entitled to an administrative 
hearing. R., p. 120. Furthermore, the court held that a hearing pursuant to I.C. $49-326(4) was 
meaningless unless it covered 1.C. 518-8002 and I.C. § 18-8002A issues, thus Wanner is entitled to 
an administrative hearing pursuant to LC. $18-8002, LC. $18-8002A and I.C. $49-326(4). R., pp. 
120-121. IDOT timely filed its Notice of Appeal of the district court's decision. R., pp. 122-126. 
11. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the district court erred in its determination that Wanner is entitled to an 
administrative hearing on his non-commercial driving privileges pursuant to I.C. $1 8-8002 andior 
I.C. $ 18-8002A? 
2. Whether the district court erred in its determination that the Notice of Suspension 
Form violated Wanner's due process rights. 
111. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Because this is an administrative appeal, the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act applies 
(IDAPA). IDAPA requires the appealing party (Wanner) to first show that IDOT erred in a manner 
as described in I.C. $ 67-5279(3). Lane Ranch P'ship v. City oj"Sun Valley, 144 Idaho 584,590, I66 
P.3d 374, 380 (2007). Idaho Code $ 67-5279(3) states that courts performing judicial reviews of 
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agency decisions "shall affirm the agency action unless the court finds that the agency's findings, 
inferences, conclusions, or decisions are: 
(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; 
(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency; 
(c) made upon unlawful procedure; 
(d) not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or 
(e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion." 
IDAHO CODE 67-5279(3). 
After establishing at least one of the above violations, the appealing party (Wanner) must 
then show that the hearing officer's error prejudices the appellant's substantial rights as required by 
I.C. § 67-5279(4). Lane Ranch P'ship, 144 Idaho at 590, 166 P.3d at 380. If the appealing party 
ultimately prevails, the order is "set aside in whole or in part and the case remanded." Haw v. Idaho 
Stale Bd ofMed,  140 Idaho 152, 157,90 P.3d 902,907 (2004). 
"On appeal from adecision rendered by the district court while acting in its appellate capacity 
under IDAPA, this Court directly reviews the district court's decision." Dry Creek Partners, LLC 
v. Ada County Cornm'rs, - Idaho-, 217 P.3d 1282, 1287 (2009). 
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IV. 
ARGUMENT 
A. WAMVERIS NOT ENTITLED TO AN ADMIM[STRATTVE HEARING PURSUANT 
TO I.C. $18-80025 AND I.C. $18-8002A. 
The District Court Should Be Reversed Because Wanner Did Not Exhaust His 
Administrative Remedies. Wanner failed to timely request an administrative hearing pursuant to 1.C. 
$1 8-8002A, thus the suspension of his non-commercial or Class D driving privileges, imposed by 
IDOT, should be affirmed. Idaho Code $ 18-8002A states in part: 
(2) Information to be given. At the time of evidentiary testing for 
concentration of alcohol, or for the presence of drugs or other intoxicating substances 
is requested, the person shall be informed that if the person refuses to submit to or 
fails to complete evidentiary testing, or if the person submits to and completes 
evidentiary testing and the test results indicate an alcohol concentration or the 
presence of drugs or other intoxicating substances in violation of section 18-8004, 
18-8004C or 18-8006, Idaho Code, the person shall be informed substantially as 
follows (but need not be informed verbatim): 
If you refuse to submit to or if you fail to complete and pass evidentiary 
testing for alcohol or other intoxicating substances: 
(a) The peace officer will seize your driver's license and issue a notice of 
suspension and a temporary driving permit to you, but no peace officer will issue you 
a temporary driving permit if your driver's license or permit has already been and is 
suspended or revoked. No peace officer shall issue a temporary driving permit to a 
*Idaho Code $1 8-8002 pertains largely in part to penalties and suspensions arising from the 
refusal of a motor vehicle operator to submit to evidentiaryitoxicology testing when requested by a 
law enforcement officer who has reasonable suspicion to believe that the operator was operating a 
motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, drugs or other intoxicating substances. See 
generally IDAHO CODE 318-8002. Idaho Code $18-8002A pertains largely in part to the penalties 
and administrative procedures associated with and provided to the operator of a motor vehicle who 
submitted to and failed evidentiaryitoxicology testing. See generally IDAHO CODE $ 18-8002A. In 
this case, Wanner submitted to and failed evidentiaryltoxicology testing. 
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driver of a commercial vehicle who refuses to submit to or fails to complete and pass 
an evidentiary test; 
(b) You have the right to request a'hearing within seven (7) days of the notice 
of suspension of your driver's license to show cause why you refused to submit to or 
to complete and pass evidentiary testing and why your driver's license should not be 
suspended; 
(d) If you complete evidentiary testing and fail the testing and do not request 
a hearing before the department or do not prevail at the hearing, your driver's license 
will be suspended. This suspension will be for ninety (90) days if this is your first 
failure of evidentiary testing, but you may request restricted noncommercial vehicle 
driving privileges after the first thirty (30) days. The suspension will be for one ( I )  
year if this is your second failure of evidentiary testing within five (5) years. You will 
not be able to obtain a temporary restricted license during that period; 
(4) Suspension. 
(a) Upon receipt of the sworn statement of a peace officer that there existed 
legal cause to believe a person had been driving or was in actual physical control of 
a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, drugs or other intoxicating 
substances and that the person submitted to a test and the test results indicated an 
alcohol concentration or the presence of drugs or other intoxicating substances in 
violation of section 18-8004.18-8004C or 18-8006, Idaho Code, the department shall 
suspend the person's driver's license, driver's permit, driving privileges or 
nonresident driving privileges: 
(i) For a period of ninety (90) days for a first failure of evidentiary testing 
under the provisions ofthis section. The first thirty (30) days of the suspension shall 
be absolute and the person shall have absolutely no driving privileges of any kind. 
Restricted noncommercial vehicle driving privileges applicable during the remaining 
sixty (60) days of the suspension may be requested as provided in subsection (9) of 
this section. 
(ii) For a period of one ( I )  year for a second and any subsequent failure of 
evidentiary testing under the provisions of this section within the iminediately 
preceding five (5) years. No driving privileges of any kind shall be granted during 
the suspension imposed pursuant to this subsection. 
The person may request an administrative hearing on the suspension as 
provided in subsection (7) of this section. Any right to contest the suspension shall 
be waived if a hearing is not requested as therein provided. 
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(7) Administrative Hearing on Suspension. 
A person who has been served with a notice of suspension after submitting 
to an evidentiary test may request an administrative hearing on the suspension before 
a hearing officer designated by the department. The request for a hearing shall be 
in writing and must be received by the department within seven (7) calendar days 
of the date of service upon theperson of the notice of suspension, and shall include 
what issue or issues shall be raised at the hearing. The day on which the request was 
received shall be noted on the face of the request." 
IDAHO CODE r) 18-800214 (emphasis added). 
IDAPA Rule 39.02.72 - Rules Governing Administrative License Suspensions, is also 
applicable. 
Hearing requests must be received by the Department no later than 5 p.m. of the 
seventh day following the service of the Notice of Suspension. Hearing requests 
received after that time shall be considered untimely. The Departmentshall deny an 
untimely hearing request unless the petitioner can demonstrate that a request 
should be granted 
IDAPA Rule 39.02.72, 100.02 (emphasis added) 
Wanner's failure to timely request an administrative hearing pursuant to I.C. r) 18-8002A and 
IDOT's refusal to allow him to have an administrative hearing due to his untimely request is wholly 
statutory and jurisdictional, thus negating the district court's authority to allow Wanner to have an 
administrative hearing. "Actions of state agencies or officers or actions of a local government, its 
officers or its units are not subject to judicial review unless expressly authorized by statute." 
IRCP 84(a). "Judicial review of an administrative decision is wholly statutory; there is no right of 
judicial review absent the statutory grant." Cobbley v. City ofChallis, 143 Idaho 130, 133, 139 P.3d 
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732, 735 (2006). "It therefore goes almost without saying that if the exclusive and otherwise 
unavailable method is set forth in the provided-for judicial review procedures, one cannot challenge 
in a separate civil suit the action of a board where that board has acted on matters within its 
jurisdiction." Id. at 134, 139 P.3d at 736. 
In this case, I.C. $18-8002A(4) is explicit in its verbiage that any right to contest the 
suspensionpursuant to LC. $18-8002A shall be deemedwaived if a hearing is not requested within 
the statutory allotted seven (7) days. This statutory mandate negates Wanner's ability to have an 
administrative hearing pursuant to I.C. $18-8002A since Wanner's right to have an administrative 
hearing does not rise unless he exhausts his administrative remedies and timely requests an 
administrative hearing within the seven (7) day requirement. Prior to seeking judicial review, 
Wanner must have first exhausted all of his administrative remedies. IDAHO CODE 67-5271 ; Nation 
v. State, Dept. of Corr., 144 Idaho 177, 193,158 P.3d 953,969 (2007)(Before a court can hear an 
appeal from an agency adjudication, the litigant must first exhaust the administrative remedies made 
available to him.). If Wanner had timely filed his request, the procedure and standard of review 
would he governed by I.C. $1 8-8002A(7). However, Wanner failed to exhaust his administrative 
remedies by failing to request an administrative hearing in a timely fashion. 
Pursuant to I.C. $18-8002A(4), Wanner had to have requested his administrative hearing 
within seven (7) days of the date on the Notice of Suspension form. Because he did not, Wanner 
waived his right to contest the suspension as detailed in I.C. $1 8-8002A(4) and I.C. $1 8-8002A(7). 
The arresting officer read, explained and personally served the Notice of Suspension Form to 
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Wanner on August 7,2008. As is reflected by the Administrative Record, Wanner did not request 
an administrative hearing, pursuant to I.C. $18-8002A, until August 21,2008, fourteen (14) days 
later and well outside the statutory required period of time of seven (7) days. 
Furthermore, when Wanner did finally request an administrative hearing, he did not provide 
the IDOT any explanation or basis whatsoever for the untimeliness of his hearing request. See R., 
pp. 5-6. Because of his untimely request and his failure to provide an explanation or basis for his 
untimeliness, as contemplated and allowed by IDAPA Rule 39.02.72. 100.02, IDOT appropriately 
rejected Wanner's request for an administrative hearing pursuant to LC. $18-8002A. 
Due to Wanner's failure to timely request an administrative hearing, as well as his failure to 
describe the basis for his untimely request for a hearing, he has waived, pursuant to the plain 
language of the statute and IDAPA rules, any right to contest the suspension that has been imposed 
by the IDOT pursuant to LC. $18-8002A. Wanner failed to exhaust his administrative remedies by 
failing to timely file his petition for an administrative hearing within the time limits prescribed by 
LC. $ 18-8002A. The time limits prescribed by I.C. $18-8002A are jurisdictional, warranting a 
dismissal of Wanner's request for an administrative hearing'pursuant to I.C. $ 18-8002A. 
B. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ITS DETERMINATION THAT THE NOTICE 
OF SUSPENSION FORM DENIED WANNER DUE PROCESS. 
1. Wanner H a d s e u u e n c e s  For Failure Of 
Evidentiary Testing. 
The essence of Wanner's argument and the district court's decision warranting him the relief 
he seeks is that the Notice of Suspension Form read to him did not provide him adequate notice 
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regarding the suspension of his commercial driving privileges. R., pp. 69-70, 120. Wanner's self 
rationalization, interpretation of the Notice of Suspension Form and ignorance of the law does not 
provide him an escape route from the laws and rules that he must abide by. The law presumes 
individuals have knowledge of the laws under which they are governed and must abide by. 
Our entire legal system is based upon the principle that persons are charged with 
constructive knowledge of the statutes and laws. Property owners are bound and 
often deprived of property by encumbrances shown in the real estate records. 
Criminals are bound and often deprived of their liberty by violations of the criminal 
statutes of which they had no personal knowledge. Tortfeasors are bound and often 
deprived ofproperty by violations of both statutes of which they had no knowledge, 
and the common law which may not have been "discovered" by the courts until that 
case, and then perhaps on appeal. In none of these cases does procedural due 
process allow a defense or complaint based upon ignorance of the law or upon the 
government's failure to take reasonable steps to inform the public of thesubstance 
of the statutes. 
Powers v. Canyon County, 108 Idaho 967, 970, 703 P.2d 1342, 1345 (1985)(Intemal citations 
omitted.)(emphasis added). 
Idaho Code 518-8002, Idaho's implied consent statute, states in part: 
(1) Any person who drives or is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle in this 
state shall be deemed to have given consent to evidentiary testing for concentration 
of alcohol as defined in section 18-8004, Idaho Code, and to have given his consent 
to evidentiary testing for the presence of drugs or other intoxicating substances . . . 
IDAHO CODE 18-8002. See also State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300,302, 160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007)("In 
Idaho 'any person who drives or is in actual physical control' of a vehicle impliedly consents to 
evidentiary testing for alcohol at the request of apeace officer with reasonable grounds for suspicion 
of DUI.") 
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Commercial driver's license holders in Idaho are governed, in part, by Idaho Code 3 49-335, 
which relates to disqualifications and penalties of commercial driver's licenses. Specifically, 
regarding the notice issues regarding the failure of evidentiary testing, the statute reads: 
(2) Any person who operates a commercial motor vehicle or who holds a 
class A, B or C driver's license is disqualified from operating a commercial motor 
vehicle for a period of not less than one (1) year if the person refuses to submit to or 
submits to and fails a test to determine the driver's alcohol, drug or other intoxicating 
substances concentration while operating a motor vehicle. 
This suspension can be appealed to the IDOT as described in I.C.3 49-326(4). Pursuant to 
I.C. 3 49-330, a petition for judicial review of the department's decision, too, may be filed. 
However, prior to seeking judicial review, and as discussed previously above, Wanner must first 
exhaust all of his administrative remedies. 
The Notice of Suspension Form reviewed by the arresting officer and provided to Wanner 
detailed the notice requirements that are statutorily imposed to be provided to an individual prior to 
being asked to submit to evidentia~y testing pursuant to LC. 3 18-8002 and I.C. 18-8002A. Idaho 
law mandates strict adherence to the language of I.C. 5 18-8002. "This Court has previously held 
that the information required by I.C. 3 18-8002 is set forth 'in no uncertain terms,' and that our 
Supreme Court has 'emphatically discountenanced interjection of judicial gloss upon the 
legislature's license suspension scheme."' Virgil v. State, 126 Idaho 946,947,895 P.2d 182,183 (Ct. 
App. 1995)(intemal citations omitted). 
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A close reading of the Notice of Suspension Form readlplayed to Wanner reveals first, in 
paragraph 4(B) that if an individual refuses to submit to evidentiary testing, the temporary permit 
that is given (if eligible) does not provide for commercial driving privileges of any kind. R., pp. 
14-15. A temporary permit cannot be given because the separate law controlling commercial 
driver's licenses, i.e. I.C. $49-335(2), does not allow for it and this statement clarifies any ambiguity 
that may be raised because of the controlling, mandatory language of LC. $49-335(2). Second, in 
paragraph 5(A), the individual who submits to evidentiary testing is told that any temporary permits 
given do not allow an individual to operate a commercial vehicle. R., pp. 14-15. Once again, this 
is due to the controlling language of 1.C. $49-335(2) as it pertains to commercial driving privileges 
suspensions. In paragraph 5(B), the individual who submits to evidentiary testing and later requests 
and obtains restricted driving privileges is told, yet once again, that the restricted driving privileges 
do not allow for the operation of a commercial motor vehicle. R., pp. 14-1 5. As previously stated, 
this is due to the controlling language in I.C. $49-335(2) which already covers the notice 
requirements for commercially licensed drivers regarding evidentiary testing and the potential 
ramifications of either refusing to submit to or failing evidentiary testing. 
Pursuant to I.C. $1 8-8002A(2), the operator of a motor vehicle need not be informed 
verbatim, rather, he need only to be "substantially" informed of the information contained in 
section 2. IDAHO CODE 18-8002A(2); Halen v. State, 136 Idaho, 829,834,41 P.3d 257,262 (2002). 
Wanner does not dispute that the Notice of Suspension Form was read to him, nor does he dispute 
that he was provided the information as required by I.C. $ 18-8002 and I.C. $ 18-8002A. Rather, 
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Wanner contends that the Notice of Suspension Form is defective due to it failing to notify him of 
the consequences to his commercial driving privileges as detailed in I.C. $49-335(2), even though 
he was operating a non-commercial vehicle. 
The Notice of Suspension Form read to Wanner was statutorily sufficient, even though 
Wanner has a CDL and was operating a non-commercial vehicle. Idaho Code $18-8002A(2) 
mandates the information that must be given prior to an administrative suspension pursuant to 
I.C. $18-8002A can be imposed. Nothing within the statute requires that operators of motor vehicles 
be notified that a failure of evidentiary testing will result in the suspension or disqualification of a 
CDL holder from operating a commercial vehicle for one (1) year. Whether all of the potential 
consequences for failing or rehsing to submit to toxicology testing must be provided prior to a 
suspension can be entered has not been addressed by Idaho's appellate courts. However, an analysis 
made by Wyoming's Supreme Court is instructive on this notice issue.6 
In Escarcega v. Wyoming Department of Transportation, 153 P.3d 264 (Wyo. 2007), the 
Wyoming Supreme Court addressed a similar notification issue to CDL holders, though in the 
context of a refusal to submit to evidentiary testing. Both Idaho and Wyoming have substantially 
similar implied consent statutes and both states have substantially similar statutory mandates that 
60n  January 13,201 0 the Honorable Jeff M. Brudie, Idaho District Court Judge in the Second 
Judicial District, entered his Memorandum Opinion and Order on Petition for Judicial Review in Nez 
Perce County case number CV09-01585. In part, his decision relied upon Escarcega v. Wyonting 
Department of Transportation, 153 P.3d 264 (Wyo. 2007). Judge Brudie addressed the notice and 
due process questions which are similarly posed in this appeal. A true and correct copy of Judge 
Brudie's decision is submitted herewith as Exhibit A. 
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require what information must be provided to the operators of motor vehicles whom are requested 
to submit to evidentiaryltoxicology testing. See Ex. A, Mem. Op. and Order on Pet for Judicial 
Review, p. 14-15, n. 18. 
In Escarcega, Escarcega (like Wanner) was a CDL holder who was arrested for DUI while 
operating a non-commercial motor vehicle. Id. at 15; Escarcega, 153 P.3d at 266. The arresting 
officer informed Escarcega of the statutory notification requirements relative to his refusal to submit 
to or his failure of evidentiary testing. Id. Similar to Idaho's Notice of Suspension Form, Escarcega 
was not advised of the consequences to his CDL should he fail or refuse to submit to evidentiary 
testing. Id. Escarcega refused evidentiary testing and timely requested an administrative hearing, 
arguing that his commercial driving privileges should not be suspended since the officer did not 
provide him notice of the consequences of refusing, to his commercial driving privileges. Id.; 
Escarcega, 153 P.3d at 267. The administrative hearing officer upheld the suspension, as did the 
district court and Escarcega appealed to the Wyoming Supreme Court. Id. 
In upholding the suspension imposed against Escarcega, the Wyoming Supreme Court found 
there was no ambiguity in the statute mandating the specific warnings to be given and the Court 
further found that the legislature did not choose to require warnings regarding potential commerical 
driving privilege disqualifications. The Court wrote: 
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It would be impractical to require that an arresting officer convey all the 
information in both statutory schemes7 to an arrestee before requesting a specimen 
for chemical testing. The implied consent and various driver's license statutes 
contain multiple interrelated provisions for penalties that may be heightened or vary 
according to the circumstances of each violation. To require a detailed recitation of 
all statutory penalties involved in a traffic stop would be a misuse of law enforcement 
resources and would not serve the purpose of the implied consent statutes. The 
implied consent law was intended as a complement to the DWU18 statute and was 
designed to facilitate tests for intoxication, not to inhibit the ability to keep drunk 
drivers off the road. (Internal citation omitted). 
Implied consent is, by nature, implied in law. Merely by choosing to drive a motor 
vehicle on the roads of this state, a driver agrees to submit to chemical testing in the 
event of his arrest for DWUI. The consequences for refusing [or failing] a chemical 
test are published law, of which every citizen is presumed to have knowledge. See 
Cheek v. United States. 498 U.S. 192. 199. 11 1 S.Ct. 604. 609. 112 L.Ed.2d 61 7 
(1 99 1). The Legislature has created a few limited exceptions to that rule by requiring 
that specific warnings be given to drivers in certain situations before penalties can be - - 
imposed. Appellant here was given the precise warning required by the applicable 
statutes,for a driver stopped in a non-commercial vehicle. He was entitled to no 
more and no less. 
Id. at 15-16; Escarcega, 153 P.3d at 270. 
Like Wyoming, Idaho's DUI statutes contain "multiple interrelated provisions for penalties 
that may be heightened or vary according to the circumstances of each violation." See Ex. A, Mem. 
Op. and Order on Pet.for Judicial Review, p. 16. Idaho Code 5 18-8005 pertains to penalties relating 
to DUI. This statute also refers to suspensions imposed by I.C. 549-335. Similar to Wyoming, 
7Wyoming has two implied consent statutes, one for drivers of commercial vehicles and one 
for drivers of non-commercial vehicles. See Ex. A, Mem. Op, and Order on Pel. for Judicial 
Review, pp. 14-1 5., n. 18. 
'Wyoming uses the acronym DWUI for driving under the influence as compared to DUI for 
Idaho. 
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Idaho's legislature, too, opted not to reference I.C. $49-335 within the mandatory notice provisions 
as detailed in I.C. $1 8-8002A(2). In response to Escarcega, the district court for the Second Judicial 
District wrote: 
This Court finds the reasoning of the Wyoming Court sound. Idaho's 
legislature set forth in1.C. $ 18-8002A(2)(sic) the specific consequences a driver must 
be informed about prior to a law enforcement officer's request that a driver perform 
evidentiary testing subject to a DUI arrest. While the notification may not cover all 
potential consequences of refusing to submit to evidentiary testing or of failing 
evidentiary testing, it is all that Idaho's legislature has required, no more and no less. 
If this Court found that more was required than has been set forth by the legislature, 
barring a constitutional ground, it would be tantamount to the Court making law. 
Courts have the power to interpret law, not to make law. The power to make law 
rests instead with the legislature. Electrical Wholesale Supply Co. v. Nielson, 136 
Idaho 814,825,41 P.3d 242,253 (2001). 
See Ex. A, Mem. Op. and Order on Pet. for Judicial Review, p. 16. 
The commercial driving privileges suspension imposed by I.C. $49-335(2) is totally separate 
and apart from the suspension imposed by I.C. $ 18-8002A. Had the officer failed to read the Notice 
of Suspension Form, Wanner would have still been facing a potential suspension of his 
non-commercial driving privileges pursuant to the penalties as detailed LC. $18-8005, as well as the 
suspension of his commercial driving privileges as detailed in I.C. $ 18-8005(2)(b) and I.C. $49- 
335(2). Wanner, at a minimum, pursuant to I.C. $18-8002, had impliedly given consent to submit 
to evidentiary testing when he operated a motor vehicle on an Idaho roadway. Furthermore, Wanner 
had at-least constructive knowledge and notice, pursuant to LC. $18-8005 that his driving privileges 
could potentially be suspended and even more specifically, in accordance with I.C. 5 18-8005 and 
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I.C. $49-335(2), that if he failed evidentiary testing, his commercial driving privileges would be 
suspended for one (1) year. 
Wanner cannot claim ignorance of the law as to these statutory provisions, notice and 
requirements. Sufficient notice of the suspensioLs were provided to Wanner and there is no 
argument from him that the required notices were not provided to him. Wanner failed to exhaust his 
administrative remedies by timely requesting an administrative hearing. Additionally, the statutorily 
imposed time limits to request an administrative hearing required by I.C. $18-8002A are 
jurisdictional and werenot met by Wanner. Because I.C. $1 8-8002A(2) does not require notification 
of the penalties as provided in I.C. $49-335(2), Wanner cannot sustain his claim that he had not been 
adequately notified of the suspension pertaining to his commercial driving privileges. 
2. Wanner's Constitutional Due Process Rights Have Not Been Violated. 
In this matter Wanner argued, and the district court agreed, that constitutional due process 
requires that Wanner should have been given notice of the full consequences of failing evidentiary 
testing. R., p. 120. Courts must consider three factors in procedural due process challenges: 
[Flirst, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, 
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and 
the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and 
finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and 
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would 
entail. 
In re Driver S License Suspension o f  Gibbar, I43 Idaho 937,946, 155 P.3d 11 76, 11 85 (Ct. App. 
2006) citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,335,96 S. Ct. 893,47 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1976). 
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The Idaho Supreme Court has held that the state has a strong interest in preventing 
intoxicated persons from driving, as well as a strong interest in the driver's right to a prompt post- 
suspension hearing under the statute then in effect to challenge the suspension. See Gibbar, 143 
Idaho at 946, 155 P.3d 1176 at 1185 citing State v. Ankey, 109 Idaho 1,4-5,704 P.2d 333,336-37 
(1985). In In re Driver's License Suspension of McNeely, 119 Idaho 182, 804 P.2d 91 1 (Ct. App. 
1990), amotor vehicle operator claimed his procedural due process rights were violated when he was 
not allowed to choose the type of evidentiary test he would be subjected to. The Court of Appeals 
held, "Even though a licensee's interest in maintaining his or her license for employment purposes 
is substantial, we feel it must be subordinated to the state's interest in preventing intoxicated persons 
from driving on Idaho's highways, especially where the individual is entitled to post-suspension 
review procedures." McNeely, 119 Idaho at 191, 804 P.2d at 920 
"Procedural due process requires that there must be some process to ensure 
that the individual is not arbitrarily deprived of his rights in violation of the state or 
federal constitutions." Cowan v. Board of Comm 'rs, 143 Idaho 501, 5 10, 148 P.3d 
1247 (2006). "[Aln individual must be provided with notice and an opportunity to 
be heard." Spencer v. Kootenai County, 145 Idaho 448, 454, 180 P.3d 487, 493 
(2008). Due process is not a rigid concept. Instead, the protections and safeguards 
necessary vaty according to the situation. Aberdeen-Sprin@eld Canal Co. v. Peiper, 
133 Idaho 82,91,982 P.2d 917,926 (1999). 
See Ex. A, Mem. Op. and Order on Pet. for Judicial Review, p. 18 citing Meyers v. Hansen, - 
I d a h o ,  221 P.3d 81 (2009). 
The thrust of Wanner's complaint is that had the Notice of Suspension Form advised him of 
the suspension of his commercial driving privileges pursuant to I.C. $49-335(2), then he would have 
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requested an administrative hearing pursuant to I.C. $18-8002A. The suspension imposed in 
accordance with LC. $1 8-8002A does not pertain lo Wanner's comn~ercial driving privileges, but 
to his ability to operate non-commercial vehicles. Wanner readily admits he planned on just living 
with the I.C. $ 18-8002A suspension and made a decision not to request an administrative hearing. 
R., pp. 63-65; Tr. p. 4, LL. 10-21. 
The suspension to be or that may be imposed on Wanner's commercial driving privileges for 
his failure of evidentiary testing, is in accordance with I.C. $49-335. The state has a strong, 
substantial interest in regulating the drivers licenses of those who are licensed CDL holders and 
preventing them from driving the con~mercial vehicles they may operate while under the influence 
of intoxicating substances. Commercial vehicle operators generally drive larger vehicles, with much 
heavier loads, and, in the case of buses or large vans, with many more occupants than passenger 
automobiles. 
In instances such as this matter, CDL holders are provided the opportunity to have 
administrative hearings regarding the suspension of their driving privileges pursuant to 
I.C. 518-8002, I.C. $18-8002A and I.C. $49-326(4). Idaho Code $49-326(4) provides for 
administrative hearings to be made available to those who have been disqualified or suspended 
pursuant to I.C. $49-335(2). As discussed herein above, I.C. $ 49-335(2) pertains to the suspension 
of commercial drivingprivileges. Idaho Code $49-326(4) does not havea time limitation on it when 
an administrative hearing may he had, though it does require that IDOT notify the licensed individual 
in writing of the suspension. In this case, the record is void of any notifications to Wanner from 
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IDOT regarding the suspension of his commercial driving privileges because this case arises from 
Wanner's request for an administrative hearing pursuant to I.C. $1 8-8002A, which pertains to non- 
comercia1 driving privileges. R., pp. 5-6. Any license suspension imposed on Wanner's 
commercial driving privileges would be handled in a1.C. $49-326(4) administrative hearing, should 
he request it, which, as discussed above, is separate and apart from the 1.C. $ 18-8002A suspension. 
Wanner was provided notice ofthe 1.C. $18-8002A suspension, which he chose not to request 
a11 administrative hearing on said suspension. Should Wanner's commercial driving privileges be 
suspended or disqualified, then IDOT is required to provide him notice of said suspension or 
disqualification. Pursuant to said notice, Wanner is then provided the opportunity for an 
administrative hearing pursuant to I.C. $49-326(4). Because Wanner is required to receive notice 
pursuant to I.C. $49-326(4) relative to a suspension or disqualification of his commercial driving 
privileges pursuant to I.C. $49-335(2), and he is given the opportunity for a hearing relative to the 
suspension of his commercial driving privileges, his due process rights have not been violated 
relative to the Notice of Suspension Form failing to advise him of the LC. $49-335(2) consequences. 
Wanner's substantive due process rights and equal protection rights under the constitution 
have not been violated, either. 
Substantive due process, as guaranteed by both the United States and Idaho 
Constitutions, embodies the requirement that a statute bear a reasonable relationship 
to a permissible legislative objective. McNeely, 119 Idaho at 189, 804 P.2d at 918; 
State v. Reed, 107 Idaho 162,167,686 P.2d 842 at 842,847 (Ct. App. 1984). When 
legislation involves social or economic interests, it may deprive a person of life, 
liberty or property only if it has a rational basis-that is, the reason for the deprivation 
may not be so inadequate that it may be characterized as arbitrary. 
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Gibbar, 143 Idaho at 950, 155 P.3d at 1189 (internal citations omitted). 
Wanner cannot argue that there is not a rational basis for the state to suspend or disqualify 
a driver holding a CDL when said individual fails evidentiary testing. Because there is a rational 
basis for the state to keep its highways clear of intoxicated and impaired drivers, it cannot be said 
that Wanner's substantive due process rights pertaining to his commercial driving privileges have 
been violated, either. 
v. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should hold Wanner is not entitled to a hearing on his non-commercial driving 
privileges pursuant to LC. 5 18-8002A since he did not exhaust his administrative remedies and he 
failed to timely request a hearing. Furthermore, this Court should reverse the district court's 
Amended Decision and hold that the Notice of Suspension Form did not violate Wanner's 
constitutional due process rights. The stay imposed on the suspension of Wanner's driving 
privileges should be lifted and the suspension imposed. 
2 DATED this -day of February, 20 10. 
RACINE, OLSON, NYE, BUDGE & 
BAILEY, CHARTERED 
By: 
STEPHEN J. MUHONEN 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 2 day of February, 2010, I served two (2) true and 
correct copies of the above and foregoing document to the following person@) as follows: 
Gregory C. May [A S. Mail 
MAY, RAMMELL & THOMPSON, CHTD. Postage Prepaid 
P. 0 .  Box 370 [ ] Hand Delivery 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0370 [ ] Overnight Mail 
[ 1 Facsimile 
STEPHEN J. MUHONEN 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTIUCT OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
) 
In the Matter of the Driving Privileges of ) CASE NO. CV09-01585 
) 
DAVID B. GHIGLERI, ) MEMORANDUM OPINION AND 
1 ORDER ON PETITION FOR 
Petitioner. ) JUDICIAL REVIEW 
) 
This matter came before the Court on Petition for Judicial Review of the Idaho 
Transportation Department Hearing Officer's Order sustaining David B. Ghigleri's 
Administrative License Suspension pursuant to LC. § 18-8002A. A hearing on the matter was 
held on December 3,2009. Petitioner Ghigleri was represented by attorney Charles M. 
Stroschein. The Idaho Transportation Department was represented by Edwin L. Litteneker, 
Special Deputy Attorney General. The Court, having reviewed the administrative record, having 
read the briefs filed by the parties, having heard oral arguments of counsel, and being fully 
advised in the matter, hereby renders its decision. 
In the Matter of Ghigleri 
Opinion & Order on Appeal of License Suspension 
FACTUAL AND PRECEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Around 12:30 a.m. on May 21,2009, Nez Perce County Deputy Sheriff Joe Rodriguez 
was on patrol on Highway 95 in Nez Perce County when he observed a vehicle backing down 
the highway in the passing lane.' The officer pulled in behind the vehicle and activated his 
overhead lights. Rather than stop, the driver made a u-tum, drove across the median, then 
proceeded southbound. Deputy Rodriguez turned around and proceeded southbound, pulling in 
behind the vehicle after the driver had pulled over onto the shoulder of the highway. The deputy 
contacted the driver of the vehicle, later identified by his driver's license as David Ghigleri, 
asked why he had been backing down the highway and requested his driver's license, registration 
and proof of insurance. As he was talking to the driver, Deputy Rodriguez could smell a strong 
odor of alcohol. As he searched for the requested items, the deputy noticed Ghigleri was 
fumbling with his papers and his eyes were watery. 
The deputy returned to his patrol vehicle with the items requested from Ghigleri and 
requested backup and a report on Ghigleri's driver's license status. After a second deputy 
arrived, Deputy Rodriguez contacted Ghigleri and asked him to step out of his vehicle. As he 
complied, Deputy Rodriguez noticed Ghigleri used the vehicle door to maintain his balance and 
that he staggered as he walked toward the rear of the vehicle. The deputy continued to smell the 
strong odor of alcohol as he talked to Ghigleri and asked him to perform field sobriety tests. An 
I-IGN evaluation was conducted by the deputy and Ghigleri was asked to perform a walk-and 
turn task, one leg stand task, counting task and alphabet task. After forming the belief that 
Ghigleri was unable to perform the tasks satisfactorily, Deputy Rodriguez placed him under 
arrest for DUI and transported him to the sheriffs annex. 
' The facts relative to the slop and arrest of Petitioner Ghigleri were taken %om Deputy Rodriguez's narrative report 
ofthe incident. The report is located in the Administrative Record as State's Exhibit 4. 
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After arriving at the sheriffs annex, Deputy Rodriguez checked Ghigleri's mouth for 
foreign objects, noted the time, and then played the CD reading of the Notice of Suspension form 
to Ghigleri. The deputy asked Ghigleri if he understood the notice and he stated he did not. The 
deputy then played the Notice of Suspension CD for Ghigleri two additional times. Deputy 
Rodriguez asked Ghigleri if he would provide breath samples for testing. Ghigleri asked the 
deputy what he would do and the deputy told him he was unable to give him any advice. 
Ghigleri subsequently provided a breath sample into the Intoxylizer instrument but, after seeing 
the test result was 0.145, he refused to provide a second sample and stated he believed the 
instrument was incorrect.' When a second breath sample was not provided within the time 
period allowed by the instrument, it recorded a refusal as to the second breath sample. Ghigleri 
was transported to the jail and turned over to jail staff after being cited for driving under the 
influence of alcohol. 
On May 27,2009, Ghigleri requested an administrative hearing, which was held on June 
16,2009.~ Deputy Rodriguez was called as a witness and questioned by Ghigleri's attorney, 
after which oral argument was presented.4 On July 15,2009, the hearing officer entered his 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order sustaining Ghigleri's driver's license 
suspension. On July 24,2009, Ghigleri filed a Petition for Judicial Review. An Order for Stay 
Pending Judicial Review was entered by the Court. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
"A party aggrieved by the decision of the hearing officer may seek judicial review of the 
decision in the manner provided for judicial review of final agency action provided in chapter 52, 
Exhibit 2 of the Administrative Record. 
Exhibit 12 of the Administrative Record. 
Hearing Transcript tiled September 17,2009. 
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title 67, Idaho Code." LC. 5 18-8002A(8). "[J]udicial review of disputed issues of fact must be 
confined to the agency record for judicial review as defined in this chapter, supplemented by 
additional evidence taken pursuant to section 67-5276, Idaho Code." I.C. 5 67-5277. "The court 
shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on 
questions of fact." LC. 9 67-5279(1). ldaho Code Section 67-5279(3) M e r  provides: 
(3) When the agency was required by the provisions of this chapter or by 
other provisions of law to issue an order, the court shall affirm the agency 
action unless the court finds that the agency's findings, inferences, 
conclusions, or decisions are: 
a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; 
b) in excess of the statutory a u t h o h  of thk agency; 
c) made upon unlawful procedure; 
d) not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or 
e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. 
In an administrative hearing on a driver's license suspension, the burden of proof rests 
with the petitioner. Idaho Code 5 18-8002A(7) states in pertinent part: 
The burden of proof shall be on the person requesting the hearing. The hearing 
officer shall not vacate the suspension unless he finds, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that: 
(d) The tests for alcohol concentration, drugs or other intoxicating 
substances administered at the direction of the peace officer were not 
conducted in accordance with the requirements of section 18-8004(4), 
Idaho Code, or the testing equipment was not functioning properly when 
the test was administered; or 
(e) The person was not informed of the consequences of submitting to 
evidentiary testing as required in subsection (2) of this section. 
If the hearing officer finds that the person has not mct his burden of proof, he 
shall sustain the suspension. 
ANALYSIS I DISCUSSION 
In his Petition for Judicial Review, Ghigleri raises the following issues: (1) Did the Idaho 
Department of Transportation ("IDT") lack jurisdiction to hear the matter where Gnigleri failed 
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to submit two breath samples for testing; (2) did the officer give Ghigleri incorrect information 
regarding his commercial driver's license ("CDL"); (3) was Ghigleri prevented from completing 
his breath testing by the officer; and, (4) does the notification form fail to properly advise CDL 
holders of the consequences for refusing to provide evidentiary testing or of failing evidentiary 
testing. 
(A) BREATH TESTING FOR BLOOD ALCOHOL LEVELS I JURISDICTION 
Petitioner contends that when a law enforcement officer elects to utilize breath testing to 
determine a driver's blood alcohol level, a 'test' consists of two breath samples. In the instant 
matter, Petitioner agreed to perform breath testing but, after learning the first breath sample 
tested at 0.145 blood alcohol level ("BAY), declined to provide a second breath sampIe. 
Petitioner argues that not providing a second breath sample resulted in a failure to complete all 
testing and must be treated as a complete refusal under I.C. $ 18-8002A. 
Idaho Code $ 18-8002A is titled "Tests of driver for alcohol concentration, presence of 
drugs or other intoxicating substances - Suspension upon failure of tests" and reads in relevant 
part, " 'Evidentiary testing' means a procedure or test or series of procedures or tests utilized to 
determine the concentration of alcohol or the presence of drugs or other intoxicating substances 
in a person, including additional testing authorized by subsection (6) of this section5." I.C. 5 18- 
8002A(l)(e). Idaho Code $ 18-8002A addresses the civil license suspension that may result 
when apolice officer requests BAC testing from a driver, while I.C. $ 18-8004 addresses the 
criminal action that may flow from BAC testing. What constitutes a BAC 'test', as that term is 
used in the DUI statutory scheme, was addressed in State v. Mills, 128 Idaho 426,913 P.2d 1196 
(Cf.App. 1996). 
I.C. $ 18-8002A(6) allows a driver to have additional testing done at the driver's expense after the driver has 
submitted to testing as requested by a police officer. 
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In Mills, at the request of a police officer the driver provided two breath samples for 
testing. At the time of Mills' arrest, it was unlawful to drive with a BAC level of 0.10 or greater. 
Mills was charged with DUI when the breath test results showed Mills' BAC level to be 0.1 0 and 
0.09. Mills moved to have the charge dismissed, arguing I.C. 5 18-8004(2) precluded the State 
from prosecuting him for DUI where he had a test result of less than 0.10. The trial court denied 
the motion and Mills appealed. On appeal, the State argued that what constitutes a BAC "test" is 
determined by the Idaho Department of Law Enforcement policy, which stated a breath test 
consists of at least two separate breath samples, with a third sample to be taken if the first two 
sample results differed by more than 0.02 BAC units. The Court disagreed. 
Idaho Code 5 18-8004(2) plainly speaks of "a test," which the IDLE [Idaho State 
Police formerly known as Idaho Department of Law Enforcement] in turn defines 
as consisting of at least two separate breath samples. We find this IDLE 
requirement of two samples to be inconsistent with the plain language of the 
statute. We hold that one sample constitutes "a test," as that term is used in I.C. 5 
18-8004(2), and if that sample shows a BAC level below 0.10, the accused cannot 
be prosecuted for DUI under this statute. Furthermore, if more than one sample is 
taken, each valid sample constitutes a test. . . . We do not here question the 
authority of the IDLE to adopt standards requiring that more than one sample be 
taken when breath testing is performed. As stated in the policy statement attached 
as Appendix B to the state's brief, such a practice helps rule out "the possibility of 
an instrument malfunction, radio frequency interference, mouth alcohol or other 
rapidly fluctuating source of error which might effect a single result." However, 
taking two samples for quality control purposes does not permit the state to 
disregard one valid sample that shows an alcohol concentration of less than 0.10. 
For the reasons noted, we conclude that one valid sample constitutes "a test" 
pursuant to I.C. 3 18-8004(2). 
Stote v. Mills, 128 Idaho at 4 ~ 9 . ~  
In the instant matter, Petitioner makes the same argument as did the State in Mills, 
contending the deciding language as to what constitutes a "test" is found in Section 1, page 22 of 
6 In 2008, the ldaho Supreme Court in State v. Anderson, 145 ldaho 99, 104, 175 P.3d 788 (2008) affirmatively 
noted the iinding in Mills that a single result constitutes a BAC "test" within the language of the DUI statutes and, 
throughout its opinion, referred to the three breath sample results from Anderson as 'tests' plural, not test singular 
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the Intoxilyzer 5000 Breath Testing Specialist ~ a n u a l ~  compiled by the Idaho State Police, 
which reads. 
A breath alcohol test normally includes two (2) breath samples taken during the 
testing sequence separated by air blanks. The agreement of the results of two 
separate breath samples strongly refutes the possibility of an instrument 
malfunction, radio frequency interference, mouth alcohol, or other possible 
sources of error (see SOP 111.). 
Petitioner's argument is fatally flawed for the same reason it was fatally flawed in Mills. 
Language drafted by the Idaho State Police in its manuals cannot, and does not, supersede or 
override statutory language. A 'test' for blood alcohol content consists of a single breath sample 
of sufficient quantity to allow the Intoxilyzer instrument to quantify an individual's blood 
alcohol level. This is consistent with the language in LC. 5 18-8002A(l)(e), which defmes 
evidentiary testing as a procedure or test (singular) or series of procedures or tests (plural) 
utilized to determine the concentration of alcohol in a person.8 To find otherwise would create a 
legal absurdity as a driver could submit one breath sample and, after learning he had failed the 
test, could prevent the police &om collecting evidence by simply refusing to provide a second 
breath sample. While the SOP developed by the Idaho State Police strongly encourages the 
taking of two breath samples for quality control purposes, the language in the manual stating, "A 
breath alcohol test norrnallv includes two (2) breath samples", though not particularly we11 
drafted, is not inconsistent with the statutory language nor is it' at odds with the Court's finding in 
Mills. 
Contrary to the position asserted by Petitioner, the Idaho Department of Transportation 
had jurisdiction to hear Petitioner's driver's license matter. Petitioner completed and failed a 
'Attached to Petitioner's Reply Brief filed November 25,2009. The Court notes for the record that Petitioner cites 
to language within the Standard Operating Procedures manual ("SOP") to support his position. However, the SOP 
manual was not made part of the record in this case. 
I.C. $ 18-8002A(3)@) provides that a breath test as defined in 1.C. $ 18-8004 is valid for purposes of 1.C. 5 18- 
8002A. 
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BAC breath test prior to refusing to complete a second breath test as requested by the officer and 
therefore, he did not refuse evidentiary testing as that term is used within the language of I.C. $ 
18-8002A. 
Petitioner further asserts he was prevented from taking the second requested breath test 
by the officer. It was the finding of the hearing officer that the record did not support 
Petitioner's position on this issue. The Court finds there is sufficient evidence in the record to 
support the hearing officer's finding. 
Exhibit D to the Administrative Record is a transcript of the audio recording of the 
conversation between Deputy Rodriguez and Petitioner at the expiration of the fifteen minute 
observation period required just prior to a driver providing breath samples. The officer 
explained to Petitioner that the Intoxilyzer instrument will automatically 'time out' if a breath 
sample is not received after a set amount of time. Petitioner, however, continued to ask the 
officer whether it would be better for him to take the test or refuse. Deputy Rodriguez told 
Petitioner be could not advise him about what he should do, he could only explain to him that the 
instrument would record a refusal for the second breath test once the instnunent 'timed-out'. 
Petitioner then decided to provide a breath sample but, after learning tile test result indicated he 
had a BAC level of 0.145, he refused to provide a second sample for testing. Once the 
Intoxilyzer instrument 'timed-out' after a second breath sample was not provided, the officer told 
Petitioner it was time to move on to the booking process as he had given Petitioner more than 
sufficient time to decide whether he wanted to provide a second breath sample. Petitioner failed 
to show that the officer in any way prevented him from completing the second breath test that 
was requested. 
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JB) NOTICE REGARDING SUSPENSION 
Petitioner contends he was not properly informed as to the potential consequences 
refusing to submit to or failing to pass evidentiary testing would have on his CDL status. 
Idaho Code section 18-8002A requires that upon being asked to submit to a BAC 
a motorist must be given information regarding the consequences of submitting to 
and failing the BAC, by having a blood alcohol content that exceeds the legal 
limit. LC. $ 18-8002A(2). Specifically, motorists must be informed, among other 
things, that if they submit to and fail a BAC, a civil license suspension will be 
enforced against them. LC. $ 18-8002A(2). Motorists are entitled to similar 
information regarding the consequences of refusing to submit to a BAC. I.C. $ 18- 
8002(3). 
[Alccording to I.C. $ 18-8002A(2), the motorist "'need not be informed 
verbatim;" rather, he or she need only be "substantially" informed of the 
information contained in that section. 
In the Matter ofHalen, 136 Idaho 829,834,41 P.3d 257 (2002). 
The Halen Court acknowledged that I.C. $ 18-8002A(2) lists specific information that 
must be provided to a driver when evidentiary testing is requested, but noted the statute 
specifically states that a driver must be substantially informed regarding the statutory 
information, not informed verbatim. In the instant matter, the hearing officer found Petitioner 
was properly informed as required by LC. $ 18-8002A(2). 
Petitioner does not argue that the information provided to him by way of the written 
Advisoly Form and the recorded reading of the form failed to provide any of the information 
listed in LC. $ 18-8002A(2). Rather, he contends he was not provided information specific to the 
consequences of a refusal or failure of testing on his CDL status.g Petitioner further asserts that, 
in regards to CDL status, the arresting officer gave him incorrect information regarding the 
"Any person who operates a commercial motor vehicle or who holds a class A, B or C driver's license is 
disqualified from operating a commercial motor vehicle for a period of not less than one (1) year if the person 
refuses to submit to or submits to and fails a test to determine the driver's alcohol, drug or other intoxicating 
substances concentration while operating a motor vehicle." LC. 49-335(2). 
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consequences of refusing or failing evidentiary testing, thus invalidating any information 
otherwise correctly provided. 
The oral exchange between the arresting officer and Petitioner was captured on audio 
tape, which was partially transcribed and made part of the administrative ~ecord . '~  The 
transcribed portion of the exchange begins after Petitioner had been provided three readings of 
the 18-8002A suspension advisory form. Petitioner, clearly in a quandary as to whether he 
should perform breath testing, presses the officer for advice. After the officer tells Petitioner he 
cannot advise him, Petitioner appears to agree to provide breath samples for testing and the 
officer explains how to blow into the testing instrument. 
After the first breath sample is provided, Petitioner asks the officer about the result. The 
oEeer tells Petitioner he tested 0.145 and tells him the instrument is ready for a second breath 
sample. Petitioner tells the officer the test result has to be wrong and he will not provide a 
second sample for testing. The officer says okay and explains he needs to wait for the testing 
instnunent to "time out", which will result in the second test showing as a refusal on the printout. 
Petitioner asks the officer, "Does this take away my right to have a CDL?' to which the officer 
responds, "I don't know, I've seen people that have been convicted or that have a CDL . . . 
DUI." Again the Petitioner asks the officer to help him decide "the best road for me". The 
officer then tells him he has already given a breath sample. Petitioner continues to implore the 
oEcer for advice, telling him he cannot afford to lose his CDL as he will lose his job. The 
following exchange then occurs. 
Officer: Yea, it's part of the court proceedings, ok. It's part of the court 
proceedings on that you know. By taking and giving the breath sample which you 
know now it's too late, there's ways that you work with it, I mean possibly your 
attorney you know I mean may . . . I'm sure you're going to get a decent attomey. 
You're not gonna have someone you know just show up off the street. 
l o  Exhibit D to the administrative record, bates stamped as 058 through 062. 
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Petitioner: Well sure. Here's the deal. If I refuse I lose, I'm gone for a year. 
There's no way, they, I'm fired, so I don't know. I tried to understand this as best 
I could and do definitely want to go down the right road. 
Exhibit D to the administrative record. 
At that point the officer tells Petitioner he understands but that it's time to move on and 
he proceeds to provide Petitioner with his Miranda rights. Petitioner tells the officer he doesn't 
understand, he just doesn't know what to do and he still has questions. The officer tells 
Petitioner that particular part of the evaluation is over, he blew a 0.145, refused to give a second 
breath sample, the instrument had timed-out and they are now beyond that part. Petitioner then 
asks which way would mean he would not go to jail. The officer correctly informs him that 
either way he goes to jail unless he had tested less than 0.08, which would have meant getting 
him back to his vehicle and on his way home. Petitioner then asks the officer if he flunked or 
passed and the officer tells him he did not pass because he blew 0.145 and refused the second 
test. The officer, in response to Petitioner's question as to the impact of one test and one refusal, 
tells the Petitioner he does not know because he had never had that situation. The officer then 
tells Petitioner that the form he was completing asks if the driver failed or refused and, since 
Petitioner had provided one breath sample and failed, he was giving him a yellow sheet that 
would be his driving permit but the oEcer would be keeping his actual license." The officer 
read Petitioner his Miranda rights, Petitioner said he did not want to answer any questions, the 
officer said okay then handcuffed Petitioner and took him to the jail area. 
When the exchange is read as a whole, it is clear the arresting officer did not provide 
Petitioner with incorrect information. For the most part, the officer provided no information. 
I! Petitioner argues in brief that he had no way of knowing whether his test was treated as a refusal wherein he 
would need to seek a hearing before a magistrate within seven days, or as a failed test wherein he would need to 
request an administrative hearing within seven days. Petitioner's argument is without merit as he was provided a 
rern?orary drivingpermit which, as srared on the notification ionn given to ?e!itioner, an oficer may oniy do i i i i~e  
driver does BAC testing and the results are 0.08 or greater. 
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The officer consistently treated the situation in the manner prescribed for a failed test12, not a 
refusal, and he repeatedly told the Petitioner he had never had a situation where a driver provided 
one breath sample and then refused to provide a second so he did not know how the court would 
treat the situation or how it might affect Petitioner's CDL status. Petitioner contends the officer 
told him he had seen drivers with DUI charges keep their CDL. The record, however, does not 
support Petitioner's contention. First, the transcript shows the officer's response was 
unintelligible. Secondly, even assuming the officer said he had seen drivers convicted of DUI 
who held a CDL, it would not have been an inaccurate statement as a single DUI conviction does 
not result in a lifetime CDL disqualification.13 Therefore, the hearing officer's finding that the 
officer did not provide incorrect information to the Petitioner is supported by the record. 
Finally, the Court must determine whether the hearing officer was correct in finding the 
notification of suspension provided to the Petitioner was statutorily sufficient where Petitioner 
held a CDL.'~ The written suspension advis~ry'~, which was read to Petitioner three times by 
means of an audio recording, informed Petitioner that the law required him to take one or more 
evidentiary tests to determine his blood alcohol content. The notification informed Petitioner 
that: (1) if he refused to submit to evidentiary testing a refusal would result in a one (1) year 
absolute suspension of his driving privileges and, (2) if he refused or failed to complete 
requested testing, his driver's license would be seized, he would receive a temporary driver's 
license but that a temporary license would not be valid for commercial driving privileges if a 
commercial motor vehicle was being driven at the time of the arrest. The notice informed 
Petitioner that he had seven (7) days to request a hearing regarding any suspension for refusing 
l 2  The written Suspension Advisory is completed on the bottom portion consistent with a failed evidentiary test, 
wherein the driver is provided a temporary permit. Had the ofilcer treated the situation as a refusal, no temporary 
emit  would have been issued. See Exhibit 1 to the administrative record. 
f3 49 CFR $383.51 and LC. 6 49-33,  
l4 Petitioner held a Class A commercial driver's license (I.C. $49-105(16)(a)). 
I J  Exhibit I of the administrative record. 
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or failing to complete evidentiary testing but that if no hearing was requested or he did not 
prevail at a hearing, his driver's license would be absolutely suspended for one (1) year if it was 
his first refusal and for two (2) years if it was his second refusal within ten (10) years. The 
notice then advised that if Petitioner underwent evidentiary testing but failed the test, his driving 
privileges would be suspended for ninety (90) days if it was a first failure, with the first thirty 
(30) days being an absolute suspension, and that restricted driving privileges could be requested 
for the remaining sixty (60) days but no commercial driving privileges were available during the 
restricted driving period. The suspension advisory form does not include notice that under I.C. 5 
49-335(2), any person holding a Class A, B or C driver's license is "disqualified" from operating 
a commercial motor vehicle for a period of not less than one (1) year if the person refuses to 
submit to or fails testing to determine the driver's alcohol, drug or other intoxicating substance 
concentration while operating a motor vehicle. 
Idaho Code 5 18-8002A(2) mandates the information that must be given at the time 
evidentiary testing for the concentration of alcohol or other intoxicating substances is requested 
from a driver.I6 Nothing within the statutory section requires drivers to be notified that refusing 
l6 I.C. Q 18-8002A(2) reads: 
Information to be given. At the time of evidentiary testing for concentration of alcohol, or for the presence of 
drugs or other intoxicating substances is requested, the person shall be informed that if the person refuses to submit 
to or fails to complete evidentiary testing, or if the person submits to and completes evidentiary testing and the test 
results indicate an alcohol concentration or the presence of drugs or other intoxicating substances in violation of 
section 18-8004, 18-8004C or 18-8006, Idaho Code, the person shall be informed substantially as follows (but need 
not be informed verbatim): 
If you refuse to submit to or if you fail to complete and pass evidentiary testing for alcohol or other intoxicating 
substances: 
(a) The peace officer will seize your driver's license and issue a notice of suspension and a temporary driving 
permit to you, but no peace officer will issue you a temporary driving permit if your driver's license or permit has 
already been and is suspended or revoked. No peace officer shall issue a temporary driving permit to a driver of a 
commercial vehicle who refuses to submit to or fails to complete and pass an evidentiary test; 
@)You have the right to request a hearing within seven (7) days of the notice of suspension of your driver's 
license to show cause why you refused to submit to or to complete and pass evidentiary testing and why your 
driver's license should not be suspended, 
(c) If you refused or failed to complete evidentiary testing and do not request a hearing before the court or do not 
prevail at the hearing, your driver's license will be suspended. The suspension wilt be for one (I) year if this is your 
first refusal. The suspension will be for two (2) years if this is your second refusal within ten (10) years. You will 
not be able to obtain a temporary restricted license during that period; 
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to submit to evidentiary testing or submitting but failing testing will "disqualify" the holder of a 
commercial driver's license from operating a commercial vehicle for at least one (1) year. 
Idaho's appellate courts have not addressed whether all consequences for refusing or failing 
evidentiary testing for alcohol content or other intoxicating substances must be provided before 
suspension of a driver's license may be enforced. Other jurisdictions have addressed the general 
issue, though the Court found no case precisely on point. Nevertheless, the general analysis 
made by other courts, in particular Wyoming, is persuasive on the notice issue." 
The Wyoming Supreme Court recently addressed the issue of license suspension 
notification and CDL holders in Escarcega v. Wyoming Department of Transportation, 153 P.3d 
264 (Wyo.2007), albeit in the context of a refusal. Wyoming and Idaho have substantially 
identical implied consent statutes and both states statutorily mandate specific information that 
must be provided to drivers regarding the consequences of refusing or failing evidentiary testing 
upon an arrest for DUI." The notification statutes, while distinguishable as to specifics, are 
substantially the same for purposes ofthe current analysis. 
(d) If you complete evidentiary testing and fail the testing and do not request a hearing before the department or do 
not prevail at the hearing, your driver's license will he suspended. This suspension will be for ninety (90) days if this 
is your fust failure of evidentialy testing, but you may request restricted noncommercial vehicle driving privileges 
afier the first thirty (30) days. The suspension will be for one (I) year if this is your second failure of evidentiary 
testing within five (5) years. You will not be able to obtain a temporary restricted license during that period; 
(e) If you become enrolled in and are a pm'cipant in good standing in a drug court approved by the supreme court 
drug court and mental health court coordinating committee under the provisions of chapter 56, title 19, Idaho Code, 
you shall be eligible for restricted noncommercial driving privileges for the purpose of getting to and from work, 
school or an alcohol treatment program, which may he granted by the presiding judge of the drug c o w ,  provided 
that you have served a period of absolute suspension of driving privileges of at least forty-five (45) days, that an 
ignition interlock device is installed on each of the motor vehicles owned or operated, or both, by you and that you 
have shown proof of financial responsibility; and 
(0 After submitting to evidentiav testing you may, when practicable, at your own expense, have additional tests 
made by a person of your own choosing. 
"Other cases the Court found helpful in makiig its analysis are Cuthbertson v. Kansas Department of Revenue, 
2009 WL 4421263 (Kan.App. 2009) and CRanceNor v. Dozier, 658 S.E.2d 592,283 Ga. 259 (Ga. 2008). 
"Idaho has a single implied consent statute while Wyoming has chosen to enact two nearly identical implied 
consent statutes, one for drivers of non-commercial vehicles and one for drivers of commercial vehicles. 
LC. (i 18-8002 reads in relevant pat ,  ''Any person who drives or is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle in 
this state shall be deemed to have given his consent to evidentiary testing for concentration of alcohol as defmed in 
section 18-8004, Idaho Code, and to have given his consent to evidentiary testing for the presence of d ~ g s  or oti~er 
intoxicating substances, provided that such testing is administered at the request oFa peace officer having reasonable 
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Like Petitioner, Escarcega held a CDL but was operating a non-commercial vehicle when 
he was arrested for DUI." The arresting officer provided Escarcega with the statutory 
notification information required under Wyoming's notification statute for non-commercial 
vehicle drivers, but did not inform h i  regarding consequences relative to his CDL. Escarcega 
refixed testing, his license was suspended and he subsequently requested an administrative 
hearing where he asserted his license should not be suspended because the officer had failed to 
warn him of the prospect of disqualification of his CDL. The suspension was upheld by an 
administrative hearing officer and by the district court on appeal. Escarcega then appealed to the 
Wyoming Supreme Court. The Wyoming Court, finding no ambiguity in the statute mandating 
the specific warnings to be given drivers of non-commercial vehicles, found the legislature did 
not choose to require warnings regarding potential CDL di~~ualif icat ion.~~ The Wyoming Court 
stated, 
It would be impractical to require that an arresting officer convey all the 
information in both statutory schemes to an arrestee before requesting a 
specimen for chemical testing. The implied consent and various driver's license 
statutes contain multiple interrelated provisions for penalties that may be 
heightened or vary according to the circumstances of each violation. To require 
a detailed recitation of all statutory penalties involved in a traffic stop would be a 
misuse of law enforcement resources and would not serve the purpose of the 
implied consent statutes. The implied consent law was intended as a 
complement to the DWUI statute and was designed to facilitate tests for 
grounds to believe that person has been driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle in violation of the 
provisions of section 18-8004, Idaho Code, or section 18-8006, Idaho Code." 
Wyo.Stat. 5 31-6-102(a)(i) reads in relevant part, "Any person who drives or is in actual physical control of a 
motor vehicle upon a public street or highway in this state is deemed to have given consent, subject to the provisions 
of this act, to a chemical test or tests ofbis blood, breath or urine for the purpose of determining the alcohol 
concentration or controlled substance content of his blood." 
Wyo. Stat. 5 3 1-7-307(a) reads in relevant part, "A person who drives or is in actual physical control of a 
commercial motor vehicle within this state is deemed to have given consent, subject to the provisions of this section 
to a chemical test or tests of his blood, breath or wine for the purpose of determining alcohol or controlled substance 
concentration in his blood!'. 
l 9  Wyoming uses the acronym DWUI for driving while under the influence. 
" Under Wyoming law, a separate statute addresses the potential for disqualification of CDL status for refusal or 
failure of evidentiary testing for DUI. Wyo. Stat. 5 3 1-7-307. In Idaho, I.C. 5 49-33s addresses disqualification of 
CDL status for refusal or failure of evidentiary testing for DUI, as well as a number of other offenses that may result 
in disqualification. i.C. g 49-335 is referenced in LC.§ 18-8005, the penalties portion of Idaho's EUI statutes, but 
has not been made part of LC. 5 18-8002A(2), the mandatory notification portion of Idaho's DUI statutes. 
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intoxication, not to inhibit the ability of the state to keep drunk drivers off the 
road. Chastain, 594 P.2d at 461. 
Implied consent is, by nature, implied in law. Merely by choosing to drive a 
motor vehicle on the roads of this state, a driver agrees to submit to chemical 
testing in the event of his arrest for DWUI. The consequences for refusing [or 
failing] a chemical test are published law, of which every citizen is presumed to 
have knowledge. See Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199, 11 1 S.Ct. 604, 
609, 112 L.Ed.2d 617 (1991). The Legislature has created a few limited 
exceptions to that rule by requiring that specific warnings be given to drivers in 
certain situations before penalties can be imposed. Appellant here was given the 
precise warning required by the applicable statutes for a driver stopped in a non- 
commercial vehicle. He was entitled to no more and no less. 
Escarcega v. Wyoming Department of Transportation, 153 P.3d 264,270 (Wyo.2007). 
The DUI statutory scheme enacted by Idaho's legislature, like that of Wyoming's, 
contains "multiple interrelated provisions for penalties that may be heightened or vary according 
to the circunstances of each violation." Idaho Code § 49-335, which provides for 
disqualification and penalties relative to commercial driver's licenses, is referenced within I.C. 9 
18-8005 of Idaho's DUI statutory scheme. However, the legislature chose not to reference I.C. 5 
49-335 within the mandatory notice provision provided in LC. 18-8002A(2). This Court finds 
the reasoning of the Wyoming Court sound. Idaho's legislature set forth in LC. 18-9002~(2) 
the specific consequences a driver must be informed about prior to a law enforcement officer's 
request that a driver perform evidentiary testing subject to a DUI arrest. While the notification 
may not cover all potential consequences of refusing to submit to evidentiary testing or of failing 
evidentiary testing, it is all that Idaho's legislature has required, no more and no less. If this 
Court found that more was required than has been set forth by the legislature, barring a 
constitutional ground, it would be tantamount to the Court making law. Courts have the power 
to interpret law, not to make law. The power to make law rests instead with the legislature. 
Electrical Wholesale Supply Co. v. Nielson, 136 Idaho 814, 825,41 P.3d 242 (2001). 
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In the instant matter, the hearing officer found the arresting officer told Petitioner he did 
not know what impact rehsing or failing evidentiary testing would have on his CDL and, 
therefore, the officer did not incorrectly inform Petitioner of the consequences to his CDL status. 
Regarding the sufficiency of the suspension notification, the hearing officer found LC. 18- 
8002A(2) does not require an officer to notify a'driver regarding any consequences refusal or 
failure of evidentiary testing will have on a driver's Class A driver's license. The record 
supports the hearing officer's findings. 
l C )  DUE PROCESS 
Petitioner contends the holder of an Idaho Class A commercial driver's license is 
deprived of procedural due process under the administrative procedures scheme established for a 
driver's license suspension. However, Petitioner has presented the Court with no basis in law' 
that supports his position and, at least in part, his claim is not yet ripe. 
Commercial driver's licenses (CDL) are regulated by, and are the creation of, federal law. 
Pursuant to federal law, no State may issue CDL's without certification of compliance with all 
applicable federal regulations and statutory requirements?' Holders of CDL's are required by 
federal regulation to report all motor vehicle violations and license suspensions to hisher 
employer and to the licensing State or jurisdiction if the violation occurs outside the issuing State 
or juri~diction?~ In addition to the self-reporting requirements, employers of persons required to 
have CDL's have certain federal regulatory re~~onsibilities?~ 
In compliance with federal law, Idaho has enacted certain statutes and regulations 
applicable to commercial driver's licenses, including LC. $49-335, which provides for the 
disqualification of CDL status for refusing or failing evidentiary testing for alcohol, drugs or 
" See 49 C.F.R. $383.23,49 C.F.R. § 383.405 and Appendix C (atp. 25) to Respondent's brief filed November 13, 
2009. 
"49C.F.R. $§383.31,383.33,383.35. 
23 49 C.F.R. Q§ 382, et seq. 
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other intoxicating ~ubstances .~~ Pursuant to LC. $49-326, the Idaho Department of 
Transportation must notify a licensee that the department has deemed him disqualified from 
CDL status, after which the licensee may request an administrative hearing, 
The suspension of a driver's license under LC. 5 18-8002A and the disqualification of 
CDL status under LC. (i 49-335 are clearly two separate and distinct procedures. In the instant 
matter, pursuant to I.C. 5 18-8002A(7) Petitioner requested and was afforded a hearing on the 
suspension of his driver's license. There is, however, no evidence in the record that Petitioner 
has yet been notified that he has been deemed disqualified from holding a commercial driving 
enhancement to his driver's license pursuant to I.C. $ 49-335. Once that notification is received, 
Petitioner has a statutory right to request a hearing under I.C. Ej 49-326. 
The deprivation of the continued possession of a driver's license is subject to the due 
process requirements under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. State 
v. Quenzer, 112 Idaho 756,757,735 P.2d 1067 (Ct.App.1987). 
"Procedural due process requires that there must be some process to ensure that 
the individual is not arbitrarily deprived of his rights in violation of the state or 
federal constitutions." Cowan v. Boardof Comm'rs, 143 Idaho 501,510, 148 
P.3d 1247, 1256 (2006). "[Aln individual must be provided with notice and an 
opportunity to be heard." Spencer v. Kootenai County, 145 Idaho 448,454,180 
P.3d 487,493 (2008). Due process is not a rigid concept. Instead, the protections 
and safeguards necessary vary according to the situation. Aberdeen-Springfield 
Canal Co. v. Peiper, 133 Idaho 82,91,982 P.2d 91 7,926 (1 999). 
Meyers v. Hansen, 2009 W L  4093782. 
Idaho's Supreme Court, recognizing the State's strong interest in preventing intoxicated 
persons from driving and, that the need to avoid overly burdensome procedures outweighs a 
driver's interesting in maintaining his license, has deemed a prompt post-suspension hearing 
adequate to meet due process requirements. In re Driver's License Suspension of Gibbar, 143 
Idaho 937,946, 155 P.3d 1176 (Ct.App.2006). In the instant case, Petitioner received 
"LC $49-335. 
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notification that his driver's license was suspended and he requested and received a hearing. 
Therefore, there was no violation of his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights relative to his 
driver's license suspension. As to any disqualification from CDL status, the due process 
requirements of notice and a right to be heard are provided for by statute. The Department of 
Transportation, upon finding Petitioner disqualified from holding CDL status under LC. 5 49- 
335, must provide Petitioner notice and an opportunity to be heard." However, the procedural 
due process that must be afforded Petitioner regarding disqualification has not yet been triggered 
as there is no evidence in the record that the Department of Transportation has deemed Petitioner 
disqualified from CDL status. Therefore, Petitioner's argument that he has been deprived of due 
process regarding his CDL status is not timely. 
Finally, Petitioner makes a passing argument that disqualification of his CDL status 
under I.C. 5 49-335 violates substantive due process rights and equal protection rights under the 
constitution. 
The rational relationship test is applied under both the substantive due process 
clause and the equal protection clause in determining the constitutionality of a law 
that does not deal with a fundamental right. Cecelia Packing Corp, v. US. Dept. 
ofAgriculture/Agricultural Mktg. Serv., 10 F.3d 616 (9th Cir.1993). "Legislative 
acts that do not impinge on fundamental rights or employ suspect classifications 
are presumed valid, and this presumption is overcome only by a 'clear showing of 
arbitrariness and irrationality.' " Kawaoka v. City ofArroyo Grande, 17 F.3d 
1227,1234 (9th Cir. 1994). Moreover, "in a substantive due process challenge, we 
do not require that the [government's] legislative acts actually advance its stated 
purposes, but instead look to whether " 'the governmental body could have had no 
legitimate reason for its decision.' " " Id Additionally, "[ilf it is 'at least fairly 
debatable' that the [government's] conduct is rationally related to a legitimate 
governmental interest, there has been no violation of substantive due process." 
Halverson v. Skagit County, 42 F.3d 1257, 1262 (9th Cir.1994) (quoting 
Kawaoka, 17 F,3d at 1234). 
State v. Bennett, 142 Idaho 166, 171,125 P.2d 522 (2005). 
The hoider of a CDL has a right to noiice find a hearing regarding :he civil diivei's licziise suspe~sion under I.C. 5 
18-8002Af7) and a right to notice and a hearing on the issue of CDL disqualification under LC. $49-326. 
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Petitioner concedes in briefing that the test to apply is the rational relationship test. More 
importantly, Petitioner cites the Court to no law in support of his bare contention that there is no 
rational basis for disqualifying a driver from holding a CDL when the driver refuses or fails BAC 
testing upon an arrest for DUI. Idaho has long recognized the strong public interest in keeping 
its roadways safe and free of intoxicated drivers who pose a risk to themselves and others. 
Therefore, there is no violation of substantive due process rights or equal protection rights as 
there is a rational relationship between disqualification of CDL status and the State's interest in 
keeping Idaho's roadways safe. 
ORDER 
The Order of the Hearing Officer entered on July 15,2009, sustaiiling the license 
suspension of David B. Ghigleri is hereby AFFIRMED. 
The Order of the Court staying imposition of the suspension is hereby LIFTED. The 
period of suspensioll Ordered by the Department of Transportation shall begin January 20,2010 
and run for the length of time ordered pursuant to statute. 
Dated this & day of January 2010. 
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